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CHAPTER ONE: 
1.0. Introduction to the Research Problem 
 
1.1. Background to the study: 
Under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the mandate to take measures aimed at 
keeping and maintaining international peace. To manifest this mandate the UNSC 
can employ violent or peaceful measures. Employment of a judicial institution is one 
of the available peaceful measures and the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a 
recent example. For this purpose, the ICC was brought into a relationship with the 
UN system and the UNSC has the power to refer situations that threaten the fabric of 
international peace to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation and possible 
prosecution1. The UNSC has a further power to defer the commencement or 
progress of cases and investigations at the ICC2. These mandates however, are 
swords that cut both ways. Under the Referral regime, the ICC benefits from the UN 
Security Council through enforcement mechanisms3 and acquires jurisdiction over 
situations it would not normally handle4. The Deferral regime on the other hand 
allows the UNSC to halt investigations or prosecutions for the sake of peace or other 
local remedies. In the same breath, the community of states in Rome wanted to 
                                                            
1 Rome Statute, art 13 (b). 
2 Rome Statute, art 16. 
3 UNSC Resolutions bind UN Members to take action and enforce them hence a UNSC referral will 
carry with it the same authority. See UN Charter article 25. 
4 Rome Statute, Art 12. The ICC has jurisdiction over states parties to the Rome Statute and over 
non-states parties who make a declaration to that effect. UNSC referral extends the jurisdiction to 
non-member states to the Rome Statute. 
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create a legitimate,  ‘just and fair’5, ‘effective’6 and ‘impartial’7 court that is 
‘independent’8 and ‘free from political interference’9. These values lie in peril at the 
behest of the UNSC/ICC relationship. The referral is a request-cum-command to the 
court to prosecute. The Deferral regime effects a stranglehold on the 
commencement or progress of investigations and prosecutions at the ICC. This 
paper intends to critically examine the pros and cons of the UNSC using the ICC as 
an instrument for keeping and maintaining international peace. The nature of the 
relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council in the light of the latter’s 
power to impact on the work of the court is therefore central in this discourse. 
Suggestions for introducing an ‘application/motion system’ to the current 
referral/deferral regimes will be made. The view taken is that the application/motion 
system will allow the ICC some more discretion. It will also facilitate the proper 
assessment of the sequencing of justice and peace by the ICC. A further suggestion 
for the entrenchment of a Reserve Jurisdiction rule will be made as this will rid the 
court of the appearance of politicisation. 
1.2. Research Question 
The main issue the study aims to analyse and examine is whether the use of the 
ICC by the UNSC as an instrument for keeping peace under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter is proper and satisfactory. This problem is broken down to the 
following sub-headings, namely; 
                                                            
5 J.Prlic (Bosnia and Herzegovina), <http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom15.htm>. 
6 W. Sadi (Jordan), J.Prlic (Bosnia and Herzegovina), D. Opertii Badan (Uruguay), M. Al Badri 
(Yemen), F. Jensen (Denmark), C. Argius (Malta), M. Cleopas (Cyprus), V. Kirabokyamaria (Uganda),  
<http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom15.htm> 
7 J. Doneval (Haiti), D. Opertii Badan (Uruguay), <http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom15.htm> 
8 A. De Abreu (Angola), T. Sinunguruza (Burundi),  P. Nze (Congo), V. Kirabokyamaria (Uganda), M. 
Al Badri (Yemen), W. Sadi (Jordan), C. Larrea (Ecuador), Y. Al Admi (Iraq), 
<http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom15.htm>. 
9 C. Larrea (Ecuador), C. Argius (Malta), <http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom15.htm>. 
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• Does the court risk losing legitimacy and independence by relating with the 
UN Security Council as its instrument for keeping peace, bearing in mind that 
the Security Council is a political body? 
• Does the current nature of the relationship unnecessarily draw the ICC into 
intervening in situations where a judicial solution is not appropriate and 
thereby confusing the peace-justice sequence?  
• How prone to abuse is the current regime in the light of the fact that the UN 
Security Council may rarely, if ever, use the ICC option for keeping peace 
against any of its members?  
• Does the current referral/deferral regime deny the court enough room to 
exercise discretion as a judicial body that it is? 
• Would introducing an ‘application/motion’ system into the current 
‘referral/deferral regime’ improve the UNSC/ICC relationship? 
• And finally, would the entrenchment of a Reserve Jurisdiction rule help 
improve the image of the court as an impartial judicial body?    
1.3. Significance of the study 
This study is principally noteworthy as it seeks to chart, appraise and critique a big 
challenge to ICC – its availability to the UN Security Council, a body political in 
nature. The implication of the study will be its suggestion to address the problem in 
an all-inclusive way. The study will consider current developments relevant to the 
field as illustrated by the Sudan/Darfur situation and the Israeli/Palestine Gaza 
conflict. The study also aims to question the effect of politics on the ICC which is a 
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judicial body. The study will further look at the ICC as body well intended to be 
available for all in the international arena and yet this is endangered by potential 
abuse by the UN Security Council and probable misapprehension by states not fully 
represented in the UN Security Council. As the theme under reflection is of exacting 
bearing to the current African situation in Sudan/Darfur, genocide and crimes against 
humanity being alleged, the study is not merely of scholastic significance. 
 
1.4. Literature Review  
The relationship between the UN Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court has been viewed from different perspectives. Views are separated between 
those supporting the role of the Council in the light of its responsibilities under the 
UN Charter and those who fear for the politicisation of the judicial regime10 and 
contend that the relationship ‘runs afoul of the very idea of having an independent 
judiciary deciding criminal liability’11. Others have viewed it as a manifestation of neo-
colonialist tendencies by the western powers12 and have pointed that in practice 
prosecutions could never be undertaken against the permanent member of the 
Council or their allies because of the power of the veto13. Therefore the relationship 
                                                            
10 Lionel Yee ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13 (b) and 16’ 
144,143-152 in Lee, R. S. (ed) The International Criminal Court-The Making of the Rome Statute-
Issues, Negotiations, Results The Hague: Kluwer Law International. See also Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 22, marginal note 65. 
11 George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin ‘The ICC-Two Courts in One?’ Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4 (2006) 428-433, 433. See also Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 21, 
marginal note 61. 
12 ‘Delegates to an African Union summit in Libya agreed a resolution to halt co-operation with the 
ICC over its indictment of the Sudanese president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir for crimes committed in 
Darfur. The AU leaders stated that the ICC represented a form of neo-colonial intervention in Africa's 
affairs that would ultimately jeopardise peace and stability on the continent’. See Phil Clark ‘Can 
Africa Trust International Justice?’ Accessed on 16 October at 2009 at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/16/charles-taylor-hague-icc>. 
13 Lionel Yee ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13 (b) and 
16’144,143-152  in Lee, R. S. (ed) The International Criminal Court-The Making of the Rome Statute-
Issues, Negotiations, Results, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
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is not for, but poised against, the African state. The UN Security Council has recently 
given life to the relationship in the form of the Darfur referral to the ICC Prosecutor. 
The resulting warrant of arrest against the serving president of Sudan, Al Bashir 
caused uproars from all sides of the perspective dice. China described it as 'an 
inappropriate decision taken at an inappropriate time'14. AU members vehemently 
opposed it15. There appears, therefore, to be confusion as to whose purpose the 
court serves when acting under the auspices of the UN Security Council, a body 
composed mostly of the western super powers and their allies. Further to this there 
is misunderstanding about the significance of the relationship especially when one is 
oblivious of the powers the court enjoys under the wings of the UN Security Council. 
An illustration is the court’s assumption of jurisdiction in cases where it would not 
have and this affords justice to individuals whose states have denied them the same. 
Therefore the exact nature, significance and purpose of the relationship between the 
ICC and Council requires some clarification so as to find a possible middle ground.  
1.5. Methodology  
The research shall mainly be library based with documented facts on the subject 
being explored.         
1.6. Limitations of the study  
The scope of the paper will be limited in terms of volume. This means that the paper 
will only highlight the main areas of concern in the UNSC/ICC relationship.    
                                                            
14 Annalisa Ciampi ‘The Proceedings Against President Al Bashir And The Prospects Of Their 
Suspension Under Article 16 ICC Statute’  6 J Int’l. Crim. Just 885. 
15 In their address at the GA 63rd session, which opened in New York on 19 September 2008, a 
number of Heads of State and Ministers stressed the need for the Security Council to defer Al Bashir's 
prosecution. See <http://www.un.org/ga/63/generaldebate> (visited 20 April 2009). 
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1.7. Overview of the chapters   
The first part of the paper will be introductory. It will present an overview of problem, 
define key concepts and delimit the scope of research project. It will finally lay an 
outline of thesis.  
 
Chapter two will discuss the affinity for control the world’s top powerful nations have 
portrayed from the days of the Versailles Treaty to the present UNSC. An overview 
of the development of the international criminal law from Nuremberg through the ad 
hoc tribunals to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the current trends, outline of 
some of the current fundamental issues, the current debates on the Rome Statute, 
will aid the discussion. 
 
Chapter three will raise the problem of using the ICC as an instrument for keeping 
peace under the auspices of the UNSC. A critique and appraisal of the UNSC/ICC 
relationship and considerations the need to redefine or temper it will be made. It will 
further highlight a few reflections from international customary law and jurisprudence. 
 
Chapter four will discuss the concept of an ideal court through a synthesis of the 
objectives under the Rome Statute and the UN Charter. An analysis of some of the 
suggested alternatives towards the development of an application/motion system or 
the improvement of the current referral regime to immunise it from appearance of 
bias or politicisation and the other problematic aspects raised will follow. It will finally 
underscore the need for an International sense of justice, legitimacy and impartiality 
at the ICC. 
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Chapter five will summarise the concerns and recommendations made in the 
research paper and draw conclusions there from. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0.  The Genealogy of Power and the Affinity for Control 
2.1.0. Introduction:  
Since the inception of the idea of nation states, there have inevitably been powerful 
and weaker states. The powerful ones have tried all their best to keep the status 
quo. To achieve this end, amassing military strength and attaining rapid economic 
development are some of the options available. Of interest in this chapter is the grip 
on the international justice system as a tool for maintaining international supremacy. 
The international Criminal Court (ICC) as a major new institution of the 20th Century 
could not escape the affinity powerful states have for the control of the international 
justice system and its mechanisms. This is however not unusual. History of the role 
of powerful states in the law of nations will reveal a constant thread of control over 
international justice mechanisms. International criminal law is a particular illustration.  
This chapter will follow the thread from the Treaty of Versailles to the current Rome 
Statute. It is envisaged that such discourse will aid a clear understanding of the 
behaviour of the UNSC towards the ICC and the ramifications of the same on the 
international criminal law system. 
 
2.1.1. UNSC and International Criminal Law:  
The progeny of the UNSC can be traced back to the pre-League of Nations era. 
Three of the current five permanent members have always been an ad hoc club 
supporting one another and emerging victors in both the first and the second world 
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wars16. At the end of the First World War (WWI) this ad hoc club17 signed a peace 
treaty with Germany at Versailles. The treaty of Versailles provided for the 
punishment of top figures answerable for war crimes committed throughout the war. 
Article 227 of the treaty created a special tribunal of five judges to be appointed by 
the very same victors and charged with trying the vanquished German Emperor, 
Wilhelm II18. This was an early attempt by the powers to use international criminal 
law as their tool for submission.  
 
During the same period, it was realised that peaceful coexistence among the nations 
was more guaranteed by a concrete covenant, duly entered into and binding upon 
the nations of the world. This was an initiative of two of the aforementioned powers, 
namely USA and UK. In September, 1916, Robert Cecil, a member of the British 
government, wrote a memorandum where he argued that civilisation could survive 
only if it could develop an international system that would ensure peace19. When 
negotiations for peace started in October, 1918, Woodrow Wilson, President of the 
USA insisted that his fourteen Points serve as a basis for the creation of an 
organisation securing international peace20. This included the formation of the 
League of Nations. Its Covenant, adopted at the Paris Peace Conference in April, 
                                                            
16 USA, UK and France. 
17 Then included Italy and Japan. See. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd Ed), 317. 
18 See Peace Treaty of Versailles accessed on 24 October 2009 at 
<http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/versa6.html>. The tribunal never tried the Emperor as he 
sought asylum in the Netherlands and extradition was refused. The composition of the tribunal further 
received heavy criticism from eminent publicists rendering it unworkable. Cf Cassese, International 
Criminal Law (2nd Ed), 317. 
19 History of the League of Nations Accessed on 7th Oct 2009 at 
<http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWleague.htm>. 
20 Philip J Strollo ‘League of Nations Time Line’ Accessed on 7th October 2009 at 
<http://worldatwar.net/timeline/other/league18-46.html>. 
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1919, provided for the creation of the Council of the League of Nations21. It was 
arguably the most powerful arm of the League as it included two of the powers 
discussed above namely UK and France22.  
 
On the legal plane, the powers fashioned for themselves a tight grip on the 
international justice and peace system. They endowed themselves with the right to 
create the International court of Justice23. It is contended that this was a measure to 
ensure that the international justice system remains at the disposal of the powerful. 
This is a clear illustration of the hunger for control of the justice system the mighty 
nations have possessed. The Council had a further power to refer matters to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for advisory opinions24. 
 
2.1.2. The Decline of the League of Nations: 
The effectiveness of the League of Nations was severely challenged when the 
Second World War (WWII) broke out. It was then realised that the League of Nations 
                                                            
21 Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 4. 
 
‘The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, 
together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of 
the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion’. 
 
22 The Council had four permanent members (the two others were Italy and Japan). Failure by the US 
Congress to ratify the Covenant kept USA out of the League of Nations. It however played a vital role 
in world politics. See Philip J Strollo ‘League of Nations Time Line’ Accessed at 
<http://worldatwar.net/timeline/other/league18-46.html> on 7th October 2009. 
23 Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 14; 
  
‘The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for 
the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be 
competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties 
thereto submit to it. 
 
24 Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 14. This is arguably an ancestor to the UNSC referral under 
the Rome Statute art.13 (b). 
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was not living up to its dream of securing international peace25. The United States of 
America never became a member to the League of Nations despite the whole 
concept being a brainchild of Woodrow Wilson, an American president26. The Soviet 
Union was a member for a short period of six years27. On October 21, 1933, 
Germany withdrew from the League of Nations28. In 1935 the Nazi Government 
decided to take the first open steps to free itself from its obligations under the Treaty 
of Versailles29. Hitler’s ensuing ‘order for rearmament, contrary Germany’s 
obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations30, the introduction of 
obligatory armed service, the occupation of the Rhineland, the seizure of Austria, 
and the action against Czechoslovakia31’ are clear illustrations of how ineffective the 
League of Nations had become. It could not stop the nations of the world from 
offending the core principles of the covenant. The epitome of the disintegration was 
the break-out of WWII. The League of Nations had failed to secure international 
peace.  
 
The chapter of the League of Nations was therefore closed. In 1946, its 
responsibilities were handed over to the United Nations32 which had officially come 
                                                            
25 The Covenant of the League of Nations, Preamble at 
http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/versa1.html. 
26 Philip J Strollo ‘League of Nations Time Line’ Accessed at 
<http://worldatwar.net/timeline/other/league18-46.html> on 7th October 2009. 
27 Philip J Strollo ‘League of Nations Time Line’ Accessed at 
<http://worldatwar.net/timeline/other/league18-46.html> on 7th October 2009. 
28 Philip J Strollo ‘League of Nations Time Line’ Accessed at on 7th October 2009 
<http://worldatwar.net/timeline/other/league18-46.html>. 
29 Nuremberg Judgment, 27. 
30 Art. 8 ‘The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction 
of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by 
common action of international obligations....’ See also art. 10. 
31 Nuremberg Judgment, 33. 
32 History of the League of Nations Accessed on 7th Oct 2009.at 
<http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWleague.htm.> 
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into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, 
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and a majority of 
other signatories. 
 
After the WWII, the nations of the world were once again shocked by the horrors of 
the war and the aftermath. They quickly and once again seized the opportunity to 
organise an ad hoc club of like-minded nations selected from the victors of the war. 
They assumed control over the international justice system and this time 
international criminal law. Intensive talks were held in London on 8 August 1945 and 
France, the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain signed the charter 
creating the International Military Tribunal for the prosecution and punishment of 
major war criminals (Nuremberg Tribunal)33. These super powers were capable of 
creating such a treaty never made before because they enjoyed international 
domination in the political and military arena. This was immediately after immerging 
victors in WWII. They wanted to cement their grip on international dominance and 
criminal law was the best option. 
 
2.1.3. The Nuremberg Lesson: 
It is widely accepted that it was at the altar of Nuremberg where international criminal 
law was first and truly applied. Implicit in this assertion is that it was the powerful 
victors of WWII who created international criminal law. They then imposed it on the 
vanquished. The Nuremberg judgment, backed by the Charter for the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT), founded the individual on the international stage, outlawed 
                                                            
33 Rob Cawstone, ‘Nuremberg and the Legacy of the Law’. Accessed on 21 April 2009at 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/universal/2005/1121legacy.htm.> 
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the defences of official position and superior orders for international crimes34. It 
thereby narrowed the scope of state sovereignty, and actually convicted living 
human beings for crimes committed in the name of the state35, just to mention a few 
among the many achievements to its credit.  
 
Despite its myriad achievements, the Nuremberg left a legacy of traits never to be 
emulated. The collegiality of the court was manifestly biased as only the victors 
stood in judgement of the vanquished36. The IMT Charter was made by the same 
people who were to use it and they had the crimes in mind while making it37. This led 
to the making of a criminal statute specially tailored to convict the suspects. Further 
to this, the IMT Charter was a mere annex to a treaty made and entered into by only 
a few interested nations38. It therefore did not enjoy international legitimacy although 
later on 19 other likeminded nations acceded to it39. The Nuremberg court was 
further to be dismissed immediately after the end of the trial making it a makeshift 
court and not allowing of any appellate processes40.  
 
                                                            
34 IMT Charter art.6, 7 and 8.  
35 Goering, a senior Nazi Official was convicted for crimes he committed in the name of teh Nazi 
Government. See Nuremberg Judgment. 
36 Yitiha Smbeye, Imunity and International Criminal Law, 10. 
37 On August 8, 1945, the Charter for the IMT was signed in London. Robert Jackson’s signature “For 
the Government of the United States of America” led all the rest. He was also going to be the chief 
prosecutor for the Nuremberg Trial. See Tribute To Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson Available at 
<http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/Speeches_About_Nuremberg_Ferencz/> See also the parties to 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal pmbl., Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279. 
38 IMT Charter art. 1. 
39 The accession was an expression of support for the concepts and norms set out in the charter. See 
Tribute To Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson Available at 
<http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/Speeches_About_Nuremberg_Ferencz/> 
40 IMT Charter Art. 26. ‘The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any Defendant 
shall give the reasons on which it is based, and shall be final and not subject to review’.  
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At the earliest opportune time41, the principles created by the powerful nations and 
laid out in the IMT Charter were affirmed by a UN Resolution42 and thereby giving 
them force as core principles of a developing discipline of international criminal law43. 
In this way, the bond between the powerful states and international criminal law was 
cemented and made unbreakable. 
 
2.1.4. Rwanda and Yugoslavia: United Nations’ Nightmares. 
The evils that the Nuremberg Trial was intended to deter were yet to be witnessed 
once again in the Yugoslavian and Rwandan fields44. Massive bloodshed occurred 
while the world watched in dead silence conclusive of the then regrettable impotence 
of the international law machinery to move swiftly when needed. The United Nations 
made commendable attempts to clean its image by flipping back the pages of history 
to the Nuremberg chapter. The UNSC took a leaf out of this book and soon 
resolutions were passed creating the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)45. 
These two ad hoc tribunals took upon the disposable nature of the Nuremberg: they 
                                                            
41 On 11 December 1946, the very first General Assembly affirmed the principles of law recognized by 
the IMT Charter and Judgment – thus endowing them with universally binding legal force. See See 
Tribute To Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson Available at 
<http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/Speeches_About_Nuremberg_Ferencz/> 
 
42 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). 
43 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly ‘Principles of 
International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal, with commentaries 1950, Year Book of International Law Accessed on 19 October 2009 at 
<untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/.../7_1_1950.pdf -> 
 
44Serious violations of international humanitarian law were committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 and more was to be witnessed in the territory of Rwanda and the neighbouring 
states where genocide was one of the atrocities committed in 1994.  
45 Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) (ICTY) and Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) (ICTR) 
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were to pack and go at specified times46 and were specially made for their respective 
situations47. 
 
2.2.0. The Nature of the Ad Hocary System: 
Under the ad hocary system, a UN Resolution is passed creating a tribunal specially 
tailored for a particular situation involving commission of international crimes. The 
tribunal is specially constituted and only mandated to last a specified period and 
within a delimited area of jurisdiction. For the purposes of this paper, the relevant 
feature is the fact that the tribunal is created by a UNSC resolution. The system of 
the ad hoc tribunals is therefore, another illustration of the super power nations’ aim 
to reinforce their grip on the international justice system. A quick reflection of the 
makeshift nature of the ad hoc tribunals soon revealed that the world would no 
longer wait upon the occurrence of atrocities as an impetus to form a judicial 
institution to handle the legal side of things. This distaste for the temporary nature of 
the ad hoc tribunal system re-planted the seeds of a permanent international criminal 
court.  
 
Secondly, the fact that the ad hoc tribunals were made by the UNSC came out as a 
minus. The UNSC has its own biases being a political body that it is48. These biases 
are not well tamed in the instrumentality of the ad hoc tribunal system.  It is 
contended that the UNSC would rarely, if ever, create an ad hoc tribunal to handle a 
                                                            
46ICTR Statute, Art 7 ‘The temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall extend 
to a period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994’ 
47 ICTY was to focus on atrocities committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and 
the ICTR was to look at those in and around Rwanda. 
48 Triffterer, (ed) ‘Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd 
Ed), article 16, marginal note 1. 
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situation involving any of its powerful members and their allies49. A permanent 
international criminal court had to be formed and created without the defects 
illustrated by its progeny in the Nuremberg and the other two ad hoc tribunals. 
 
2.3.0. The Idea of a Permanent International Criminal Court: 
The failure of the UN to act promptly regarding the Rwandan and Yugoslavian 
situations provided the impetus for the speedy creation of an international criminal 
court. The idea had however been around, shelved and gathering dust50. The 
permanent court of international criminal law was to be a body free of the biases of 
the UNSC and ready to go at all times. It was to be born out of multilateral treaty and 
not a UNSC resolution which was the source of the ad hoc tribunals. The idea of a 
multilateral treaty was intended to give the court international legitimacy. It was to be 
a court commanding respect and trust in the eyes of all international players.  
 
The super powers of the UNSC realised that this was another opportunity to hold the 
international justice system in their bosom. They quickly insisted that the intended 
court be put in a relationship with the United Nations system51 and particularly the 
                                                            
49 They would quickly resolt to the power of the veto and frustrate the whole process.A good 
illustration is USA and its all-time ally, Israel. The Goldstone Report  by a U.N.-mandated fact-finding 
mission which found that both Israel and the militant Palestinian group Hamas likely committed war 
crimes and possibly crimes against humanity in their brief conflict. See ‘HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
PALESTINE AND OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES 
Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ Accessed on 19 October 
2009 at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf> The 
prospects of the report’s recommendations being followed up are in dire straits as ‘the United States 
has joined Israel in characterizing the U.N. report as one-sided and it is making clear its opposition to 
the prospect of war crimes prosecutions on the Gaza conflict in the International Criminal Court or 
elsewhere’. See ‘US Hits UN Gaza Report for Excess Focus on Israel’ By David Gollust. Accessed on 
19 October 2009 at http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-09-19-voa2.cfm 
50 The concept of an international criminal court is evident as far back as 1899 at the First Peace 
Conference in The Hague. See Yitiha Simbeye Immunity and International Criminal Law, 9. 
51 Rome Statute, art.2. 
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UNSC52. This demand was made under the backing of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter53. 
 
2.3.1. The Controversy Begins: 
At the Rome conference there was controversy over the nature of the relationship 
between the UNSC and the ICC. One front was of the view that the UNSC should 
keep hands off as the same would ensure the existence of an impartial judicial 
body54. This front was afraid that the interference of the UNSC would be detrimental 
to the workings of the ICC. The concern would be understood in the light of the 
nature of the representation in the UNSC55, in particular, the five permanent 
members equipped with the veto. The fear was that there would be political justice. 
Members of the UNSC and their allies would be assured of protection from the sting 
of the ICC at the behest of the UNSC56. Further objections were raised in regard to 
the respect for the concept of state sovereignty. It was felt that the use by the UNSC 
of the ICC would compel states to surrender a good portion of their sovereign 
powers57, a thing which states are most uncomfortable with. States were more 
                                                            
52 Rome Statute, arts. 13 and 16. 
53 As will be discussed later, Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandates the UNSC to keep international 
peace. It was thought that the ICC should be available to it for this purpose. 
54 A group of 60 like-minded states demanded an independent and efficient court. See ‘Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd Ed), Introduction, marginal note 
12. 
55 The UNSC has five permanent members (China, USA, UK, France and Russian Federation) and 10 
rotational members. 
56 Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five 
permanent members. This is the rule of "great Power unanimity", often referred to as the "veto" 
power. Hence the permanent members would veto any resolution affecting its interests or those of an 
ally. See ‘Security Council Membership’ http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp 
57 UNSC Referral has binding authority over the state concerned regardless of its affiliation to the 
Rome Statute. This is seen as a violation of the state’s sovereignty as it cannot decide to try the 
suspects itself. 
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comfortable with a court that was respectful of the concept of sovereignty as 
evidenced in the newly created concept of complementarity58. 
 
The other front was of the view that the UNSC as endowed with the power to 
maintain peace under the UN Charter chapter VII would do the job better with the 
use of the ICC. They felt that the relationship would get rid of ad hocary, a thing 
some regarded as a pure manifestation of victor’s justice. The ad hoc tribunal regime 
was expensive and was riddled with its own biases and the ICC was to be an 
institution to remedy such biases and shortfalls. It was also felt that the UNSC would 
give the court more ground in the light of its lack of universal jurisdiction59. It was 
therefore reasoned that the UNSC would afford the court a form of global jurisdiction, 
or at least jurisdiction on all members of the UN60. 
 
2.3.2. A Compromise is reached:   
In the end it was agreed that the relationship of the UNSC and the ICC would be 
tempered by the deferral regime where in certain special circumstances, the UNSC 
requests the court to adjourn for renewable periods of twelve months. This served as 
the compromise between those who wanted the UNSC to completely stay away from 
the ICC and those who dreamed of the UNSC as a filter for ICC cases61.   
 
                                                            
58 Rome Statute Preamble para. 10 and art. 1.  
59 Triffterer, (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd 
Ed)art.12, marginal notes 6 and 7. A Germany delegation to the Rome Statute suggested awarding 
the ICC with Universal Jurisdiction but the suggestion was rejected on political grounds. See also 
Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law 59, marginal note. 170. 
60 Decisions taken by the UNSC have binding authority on all 192 UN Member states. See UN 
Charter art.25. 
61 For a full list and detailed analysis of the compromises, see Triffterer Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd Ed), Introduction, marginal note 13. 
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With the compromises reached, the conference adopted the Rome Statute with an 
overwhelming majority of 120 votes62. Many delegates to the conference declared 
that the passing of the Statute was a momentous step in the history of mankind 
appropriately taken on the eve of the millennium63. The Court was now set up, with 
two strings attached to it and the UNSC holding the other ends.  
 
2.4.0. The Nature of the ICC/UNSC Relationship: The Referral and Deferral 
Regimes 
The Rome Statute provides that the ICC is an independent international criminal 
court64. It is independent in the sense that it is a standalone court. However, the 
UNSC holds two strings attached to it. These are the referral and deferral regimes. 
What follows is an overview of the same. 
2.4.1. The Referral Regime: 
In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court finds itself attached to the UNSC. The 
Rome Statute creates a UNSC Referral Regime (the Referral Regime) in the 
following fashion; 
The court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this statute if: 
... 
                                                            
62 7 Votes against and 21 abstentions. See Hans Corell “EVALUATING THE ICC REGIME: THE 
LIKELY IMPACT ON STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW” Accessed at on 29 October 2009 
<http://untreaty.un.org/OLA/media/info_from_lc/romestatute_dec00.pdf>  
63 Lee, SR, ‘The Rome Conference and its contributions to International law’ in Roy S Lee, (ed)  The 
International Criminal Court, the Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations and Results, 26. 
64 Rome Statute, preamble para 9. 
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(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have 
been committed is referred to the prosecutor by the Security Council 
acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations65. 
This regime allows the UNSC to place situations before the court for investigation 
and possible prosecution. 
2.4.2. The Deferral Regime: 
The power of deferral is the second UNSC tentacle at the ICC. The Rome Statute 
creates this regime thus: 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council,  in a 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has 
requested the court to that effect66. 
This regime awards the UNSC with the power to stop the ICC machinery from 
moving. It catches state referred matters67, proprio motu initiatives68, and even 
UNSC referred situations. 
The provision further provides that the request may be renewed by the Council under 
the same conditions69. The number of renewals was left open and hence is 
indefinite. 
 
                                                            
65 Rome Statute, art 13 (b). 
66 Rome Statute, art 16. 
67 Rome Statute, art 13 (a), Art 14. 
68 Rome Statute art 13 (c), Art 15. 
69 Rome Statute art 13 (c), Art 15. 
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2.4.3. UNSC’s Mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Keeping and 
Maintaining International Peace: 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides for actions with respect to threats 
to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. It particularly provides 
that; 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 
4270, to maintain or restore international peace and security71. 
The Charter adds that; 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures72. 
This mandate is wide enough to allow the use of the ICC as one of the measures for 
keeping and maintaining international peace. Decisions taken under this mandate 
have binding authority over UN member states. 
2.5.0. Conclusion 
The ICC is now in place as a permanent international institution. Despite the 
advantages the ICC has over its progeny in the ad hocary system, it has taken upon 
some of the traits which it was supposed to leave for it to be a better institution. The 
                                                            
70 Art 42 refers to the use of armed force where the other measures have failed. 
71 UN Charter, art 39. 
72 UN Charter, article 41. 
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main criticism is its strong link with the UNSC. This is an illustration of the super 
power nations’ love for power. The next chapter proposes a critical analysis of the 
ICC/UNSC relationship in the light of the latter using the former as an instrument for 
keeping peace. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0. The Problem of keeping Peace through Judicial Means 
3.1. Introduction: 
The Rome Statute was adopted as a determination by the community of states to 
create an independent international criminal court. The independence of the court 
would entail non-interference from any other body in its work. In the same breath, the 
community of states also decided to put the court in a relationship with the United 
Nations’ System73.  This makes the ICC available to the UNSC as a means of 
achieving chapter VII objectives of the UN Charter.  This chapter will discuss the 
attendant problems of using a court as a peace-keeping mechanism.  
 
3.2.0. Duplication of Roles and the Collision of Means 
International criminal law has been succinctly put as the criminal law of nations with 
the function of protecting the highest legal values of this community74. It guards 
peace, security and the well-being of the world as the fundamental values of the 
international community75 and recognised by the UN Charter76. The mandate of the 
ICC is clear: the provision of justice by means of an international criminal process in 
relation to the crimes within the court’s jurisdiction77. Criminal laws have deterrent 
and retributive advantages, amongst many. The deterrence as the first function of 
                                                            
73 Rome Statute, preamble, para. 9. 
74 Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd Ed), 
preamble, marginal note 9. 
75 Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 27, marginal note 77. 
76‘Peace and security’ appear more than 31 times in the UN Charter. See Triffterer (ed) ‘Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd Ed), preamble, marginal note 10. 
77 Dan Sarooshi ‘The Peace and Justice Pradox’ in Dominic McGoldrick et al The Permanent 
International Criminal Court-Legal and Policy Issues, 95-115, 96. 
 
 
 
 
[24] 
 
criminal law is the more effective way of protecting the legal values78.The hunger for 
justice amongst a population may jeopardise peaceful coexistence among people. 
Norman Dorsen79 has commented that an efficient Court would dissuade gross 
human rights violators by confronting them with the risk of chastisement80. Deterring 
these potential offenders from embarking on their atrocious adventures is an act of 
keeping peace bearing in mind that these atrocities almost always involve breaches 
of international peace. For example, it is during wars that the crimes that fall under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC most often occur81. Maintaining and restoring international 
peace and security, therefore, directly requires the employment of international 
judicial intervention against crimes of international concern82. Therefore the ICC 
achieves the peace and security objective through the instrumentality of international 
criminal law.  
 
On the other hand, the objectives of the UNSC are to take measures to  keep or 
restore international peace and security. This objective is general and wide. It allows 
the UNSC to use peaceful as well as violent means83. Creation of a judicial organ 
has been taken as a measure under this wide mandate. In the Prosecutor v Dusko 
Tadic84 the defence questioned the legality of the UNSC’s action of creating the 
ICTY and contended that it had acted ultra vires. The trial Chamber reasoned that 
the UNSC is not restricted in its use of non-military measures under article 41 of the 
                                                            
78 Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd Ed), 
preamble, marginal note 15. 
79 Then Chairman, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 
80 <http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom15.htm> 
81 Cf. Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd 
Ed),preamble, marginal note 18. 
82 Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd Ed), 
preamble, marginal note 18. 
83 UN Charter, art. 42.  
84 (IT-94-I), Decision on the defence motion on jurisdiction (Trial Chamber),(1995). 
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Charter. It contended that the measures could include setting up a judicial organ 
whose aim is to prosecute and punish individuals responsible for gross violations of 
human rights which are clearly threats to international peace and security85. 
Recently, the ICC, as a peaceful means, has been read into the mandate and has 
been employed as one of the options available86. Further, through the deferral, the 
UNSC can stop the ICC processes and thereby achieving peace by properly 
facilitating the peace/justice sequence. 
 
The above analysis reveals a dual duplication of roles. Firstly, both the UNSC and 
the ICC are trying to keep peace using international criminal law; the UNSC through 
the referral/deferral regimes and the ICC through state party referral and proprio 
motu powers of the Prosecutor. This is undesirable bearing in mind that it is only the 
ICC that is specially mandated to handle the judicial side of international peace 
keeping efforts. The UNSC should therefore only handle the non-judicial side of the 
effort.  
 
Secondly, under article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute, the UNSC may also trigger the 
jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to a state that has already ratified or acceded to 
the Rome Statute87. The ICC has a Prosecutor mandated to watch out for and 
handle matters falling within the jurisdiction of the court88. Member states who have 
dully ratified or acceded to the Rome statute fall within his scope. Therefore, the 
                                                            
85 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, (IT-94-I), Decision on the defence motion on jurisdiction (Trial 
Chamber),(1995), para. 26 and 27. 
86  UNSC Resolution 1593, referring the Darfur situation to the ICC. 
87 See Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd 
Ed), article 13 , marginal note 16. 
88 Rome Statute , article 15: The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of 
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
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UNSC action will provide jurisdiction where jurisdiction already exists. This does not 
make sense as the Rome statute, being a treaty, has already bound its states parties 
by the obligations under it. Further, the action makes the proprio motu powers of the 
Prosecutor redundant.  
 
The collision of means is manifest when the UNSC trying to keep international peace 
through non-legal means enters a deferral at the ICC. This may be at a time when 
the ICC tries to keep the same peace through prosecutions and investigations. The 
objective is common but the modus operandi are on a collision course. The UNSC 
has the power to frustrate the peace keeping action of the ICC and vice versa. 
 
However, there is a difference between the objectives of the UNSC under the UN 
Charter and the general objectives of the UN Charter. Securing international peace 
and security is a general objective of the Charter89 and also ‘lies at the heart of 
international criminal law’90. Taking measures to ensure the same is an objective of 
the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter91. The UN Charter, as an aspiration 
of all member states to the UN, can secure international peace through the UNSC 
                                                            
89 See UN Charter, The Purposes of the United Nations. Art 1 (1): ‘To maintain international peace 
and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal 
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead 
to a breach of the peace’. 
90 Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 27, marginal note 78. 
91See UN Charter, art. 39: ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security’. See also art 24 conferring the UNSC with primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
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mandates92 and/or through the ICC mandates under the Rome Statute. Both 
instrumentalities must bow to one general objective: international peace and 
security. To clear the duplication and collision as discussed above, it may firstly have 
to be asked ‘who is serving who?’ and  ‘who ought to serve who? 
 
3.2.1. Who is Serving Who? 
A closer look at the current state of the UNSC/ICC relationship reveals that it is the 
latter which is serving the former. The UNSC in its quest to secure international 
peace will bring a situation before the ICC. Here, the referral forces the ICC to focus 
on the needs of the UNSC. When the court moves on its own, the UNSC under the 
deferral can also come in and stop the court from moving. This shows that interests 
of the UNSC tramp on those of the ICC. 
 
3.2.2. Who ought to be Serving Who? 
The ICC has its own objective of affording justice given to it under the Rome Statute. 
Bearing in mind that international laws, UN treaties in particular, are made consistent 
with each other, at least in theory, it may be observed that the Rome Statute was 
made with the objectives of the UN Charter in mind93. The community of states took 
away some of the powers of the UNSC (the mandate to create judicial organs) under 
the Charter and crystallised them in the Rome Statute. From the act of creating the 
ICC under the Rome statute, it may be reasonable to infer that the community of 
states implicitly delegated the judicial function of the UNSC to the ICC. 
 
                                                            
92UN Charter, art. 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions...’ 
93 Cf. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 27, marginal note 78. 
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The Rome statute is intended to further the very interests of the UN Charter and it is 
a specialised document. It tackles the issue of international criminal justice. The 
Rome statute ‘affirms that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished’94. It further recognises that such 
grave crimes bully the protected values under the Rome statute, namely; peace, 
security and well-being of the world95. These are the same interests of the UN 
Charter under chapter VII. Therefore it is the UNSC that ought to be serving the ICC 
by awarding it jurisdiction as will be discussed later.  
 
3.3.0. The Attendant Problems: 
Having reviewed the current status quo of the UNSC/ICC relationship, it is now 
proposed to discuss the problems that ensue therefrom.  
 
3.3.1. Propagating Impunity  
The deferral, which may halt prosecutions to give way for non-legal ways of 
achieving lasting peace, may perpetuate impunity. A deferral can only be entered by 
UNSC under Chapter VII mandates. These mandates deal with the issues of 
international peace and security, breach of which most often entails commission of 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the court. Armed with the deferral, the UNSC can 
stop the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over these crimes96. Prosecutions are the 
international threshold for dealing with international crimes and the elimination of 
                                                            
94 Rome Statute, Preamble Para 4. 
95 Rome Statute Preamble Para 3. 
96 Cf. Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd 
Ed), article 16, marginal note 10. 
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impunity97. Justice delayed is justice denied. The UNSC may defer a case for 
indefinite times thereby permanently choking the formal justice system. This level of 
impunity for international crimes ‘from formal processes of justice mocks our notions 
of a coherent, civilised and competent 21st Century world system based on universal 
values’98. The State parties to the Rome Statute are determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of the serious crimes and thus prosecutions contribute 
to the prevention of those crimes99. As discussed above, an effective prosecution is 
a strong statement to would-be offenders and acts as a deterrent. The deferral, 
however, allows the stalling of (criminal) justice for the sake of the interests of the 
UNSC under chapter VII of the Charter. This may lead to the perpetration of 
impunity, a thing the creation of the court was intended to rid the world of. 
 
3.3.2. The Peace/Justice Dichotomy: Sequence over Preference 
The concept of preference in the peace/justice discourse is defeatist of its own end. 
The values of peace and justice cannot be separated from one another100. They are 
so interlinked that placing them as mutually exclusive options may lead to the failure 
of both. For instance, preference may lead to misapplication of justice and this may 
lead to escalation of the very injustices the action seeks to curb.  A handy illustration 
is the UNSC referral of the Darfur situation. Immediately after an arrest warrant for 
the serving president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, was sought, there were cries that 
the court (justice) was misapplied. AU Chairman, Jean Ping saw the action as  
                                                            
97 Rome Statute, preamble paras. 4, 5 and 6. 
98 Max Du Plessis and Jolyon Ford (eds) No Justice No Peace- Unable or Unwilling? Case Studies on 
Domestic Implementaion of the ICC Statute in Selected African Countries, 1. 
99 Rome Statute, Preamble para 5. 
100 See Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 27 marginal note 78. 
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“pouring fuel on the fire” at a moment when the AU was attempting “to extinguish the 
fire.”101 He further commented that peace and justice should not collide and that the 
need for justice should not override the need for peace102. Prof. Xavier Philippe103 
has argued that on the ground, the Sudanese government severely limited the 
operations of international NGO’s. These were the bodies harbouring victims and 
providing them with basic necessities. It was therefore the victim, the very intended 
beneficiary of the justice process, who suffered104.  The action further backfired when 
the rebels refused to negotiate for peace contending that they could not negotiate 
with a president who is going to prison105. Peace efforts were therefore frustrated by 
the means. The UNSC had preferred justice over peace instead of sequencing 
peace before justice. Therefore, using the ICC as a means of keeping peace can 
frustrate its very end of achieving peace.  
Sequencing is therefore a better replacement as it allows the provision of lasting 
justice and peace. Under this concept, one objective is not discarded for another 
because ‘the fight against impunity is inseparable from the search for peace....’106 
One objective merely facilitates the achievement of the other. In this regard for 
instance, employing the ICC option by the UNSC may be delayed so that peace may 
                                                            
101 See Tongkeh Joseph Fowale ‘Al Bashir, Darfur and ICC Arrest Warrant 
Sudanese President Omar Hassan Bashir defies ICC Warrant’ Accessed on 19 October 2009 at 
<http://international-politics.suite101.com/article.cfm/al_bashir_darfur_and_icc_arrest_warrant> 
102 World Reaction: Bashir Warrant’ Accessed on 19 October 2009 at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7923797.stm> 
103 Xavier Philippe is ICRC Legal Advisor for Eastern Europe in Moscow and Professor of 
Public Law at the Universities of Aix-Marseille III and Western Cape. 
104 Prof. Xavier Philippe, ‘International law: The Omaral-Bashir indictment by the International                                      
Criminal Court and new forms of piracy in the Indian Ocean’. Seminar presented on Tuesday, 26th 
May 2009 at the Unversity of the Western Cape, Law faculty Boardroom. 
105 See Comment by Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal President - World Reaction: Bashir Warrant’ 
Accessed on 19 October 2009 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7923797.stm> 
 
106 Eric Chevallier, French Foreign Ministry Spokesman reacting to the Sudan referral. See World 
Reaction: Bashir Warrant, Accessed on 19 October 2009 at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7923797.stm>. 
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thrive on the ground. Peace facilitates the collection of evidence, identification of 
witnesses and the resurrection of the most often fallen local justice system which is 
needed to aid and cooperate with the ICC.  
 
3.3.3. Undermining court’s legitimacy 
The UNSC is a political body and its link with the ICC brings into question the judicial 
nature of the court. When perceived as political, the ICC stops being a court and 
becomes a tool available to the few powerful states properly represented in the 
UNSC. These states will rarely use the ICC against any of their colleagues and 
allies.  A good illustration is USA and its all-time ally, Israel. The Goldstone Report 
produced by a U.N.-mandated fact-finding mission has found that both Israel and the 
militant Palestinian group Hamas likely committed war crimes and possibly crimes 
against humanity in their short conflict. It proposes that these situations be brought to 
the ICC for prosecution107. The prospects of the report’s recommendations being 
followed up are in dire straits as ‘the United States has joined Israel in characterizing 
the U.N. report as one-sided and it is making clear its opposition to the prospect of 
war crimes prosecutions on the Gaza conflict in the International Criminal Court or 
elsewhere’108. Israel therefore has immunity by alliance, a privilege Sudan clearly 
does not enjoy. This portrays the court as targeting the weaker states109 and hence a 
                                                            
107 See ‘HUMAN RIGHTS IN PALESTINE AND OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES Report of 
the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ Accessed on 19 October 2009 at 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf>. 
108 See David Gollust US Hits UN Gaza Report for Excess Focus on Israel.  Accessed on 19 October 
2009 at <http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-09-19-voa2.cfm> 
109 Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal President, in reaction to the ICC arrest warrant stated that: ‘The 
problem is that today many Africans have the impression that this tribunal is only there to judge 
Africans and this wasn't my intention when I signed for it. Wherever in the world the people 
committing genocide are, we should judge them, but not only judge the Africans’. World Reaction: 
Bashir Warrant’ Accessed on 19 October 2009 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7923797.stm> 
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political tool in the hands of the mighty. The legitimacy of the court as a judicial organ 
lies in jeopardy. 
 
3.3.4. Denying the ICC Independence 
Criminal law can only function at the national and international level where it can be 
demonstrated that its rules are and will be applied by an independent jurisdiction110. 
Any court that can be stopped at any time and without it having any say whatsoever 
cannot be said to be independent. The deferral puts the ICC in this position. Its 
processes under the Rome Statute are prevented from functioning by mere political 
pronouncements taken in UNSC111. By the wording of article 16 of the Rome Statute, 
the request is made by way of resolution. The UNSC will convene and pass a motion 
to halt any investigation or prosecution. It is not a matter that the court will do 
otherwise about. It’s a command from the UNSC upon a supposed independent 
judicial body. The UNSC can further suffocate the Court for as long as it wants by 
indefinite renewals of the deferral. The deferral is also not limited to cases or 
investigations brought by the UNSC itself alone. It also catches those under proprio 
motu and state party referral. It is therefore a full submission hold on the ICC. 
Therefore the independence of the court is in doubt. 
 
As a judicial body, the court is supposed to be making its own decisions about who 
to investigate or prosecute. It should further be allowed to halt cases only for 
                                                            
110 Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd Ed), part 
I, marginal note 38. 
111 Cf. Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) (2nd 
Ed),article 16, marginal note 2. 
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legitimate and legally acceptable reasons. The use of the deferral denies the court 
these essential attributes any judicial body must possess.  
3.3.5. Fettering the Court’s discretion 
The ICC is mandated to carry out Investigations and prosecutions. These processes 
may have been started by the court itself and yet the UNSC may just come to halt 
them. This situation puts the court on watch for the interests of the UNSC. Where it 
may seem that the UNSC may not like the prosecution and therefore enter the 
deferral, the court may hesitate to move. This fetters the court’s discretion as it has 
to make its decisions with the political interests of the UNSC in mind. The Court is 
supposed to apply judicial discretion alone. Political discretion is for the UNSC and 
should not be imported into the ICC. 
3.3.6. Justice as a Relative Concept 
Justice is a relative term and has many facets. It may be, inter alia, 
retributive/corrective, distributive/restorative, or social. This present discourse will be 
limited to the just-mentioned three. Criminal law is founded on retributive/corrective 
justice. It seeks to restore the status quo ante the crime between the victim and 
offender. It produces a remedy (punishment) which runs directly in favour of the 
victim or their survivors and thus buying them off from any contemplation of 
revenge112. In this way peaceful coexistence in a society may be achieved. However, 
it is submitted that the theory presupposes humanity’s natural aggressiveness as the 
cause of conflict and eventual criminal activity. Conflict is not always the result of 
aggressive quasi-animal instincts in humankind which deserve punishment at all 
costs. Conflict, and in most African conflict zones, is a result of an imbalance in 
                                                            
112 Gray C.B. (ed) The Philosophy of Law-An Encyclopaedia, (1999), 164. 
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human relations. Therefore, there is need for a remedy that takes care of the root 
cause of the conflict as trials cannot fully connect with these nuances. The UNSC 
referral may impose a prosecution hence misapply justice in a situation where it is 
not the appropriate remedy. 
3.4.0. The Relevance of the UNSC/ICC Relationship: 
The UNSC/ICC relationship is not undesirable through and through. With the model 
of distributive/restorative justice and Africa as a case study, the following paragraphs 
illustrate the relevance of the UNSC/ICC relationship.  
Distributive/restorative justice113, as components of social justice114 recognise that 
conflict results from competition. Once equilibrium is attained between two or more 
competing claims, conflict ceases. Maintaining this equilibrium necessarily leads to 
peaceful coexistence among the peoples. A quick survey of Africa’s post-conflict 
societies reveals a stark affinity for a distributive/restorative justice-based solution. 
The Rwandan situation illustrates the point. Romeo Dallaire115 has contended that 
there was a power imbalance between the Hutus and the Tutsi. Resources were not 
shared equitably between these competing tribes. He further contends that the Hutus 
killed the Tustis because they (the hutus) felt that, inter alia, the Tutsi were going to 
take or had taken Hutu land and property116. The ensuing Genocide was, therefore, 
a manifestation of an imbalance in human relations and not humanity’s alleged 
natural aggressiveness demanding criminal punishment. Utilitarianism, a component 
                                                            
113 It concerns the obligations of the community to the individual, and requires fair disbursement of 
common advantages and sharing of common burdens.  
114 Concerns the obligations of individual to community and its end is the common good, See Nolan R 
J and Nolan-Haley, MJ  ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’-With Pronunciations, 6th Ed. P 864. 
115 Force Commander of UNAMIR, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 1994. 
116 Dallaire,  R. ‘Shake Hands with the Devil’ a documentary on the Rwandan Genocide screened at 
15th Rwandan Genocide Commemoration held at CPUT, Cape town on 11th April 2009,  available at 
Rwandan Embassy in RSA. 
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of distributive/restorative justice emphasises the maximisation of the overall good of 
the community117  and in these post-conflict societies, it is the best philosophy to 
embrace. Further to this, it is submitted that the African sense of justice is more akin 
to this distributive/social justice. 
African philosophy has been succinctly put as ‘Umuntu ngubuntu ngabantu’(‘I am 
because we are’). This communitarian approach lends voice to the argument that 
retributive justice may be alien to Africa. Firstly, African legal systems capsulate that 
laws are instruments of conciliation, compromise, consensus and reconciliation118. 
This precept presupposes that conflict and crimes are a result of a failure in human 
relations. The situation must therefore call for a restoration of the community bonds. 
The ICC may be impotent to achieve peace here. 
 
Secondly, law in an African situation transcends the sphere of the individual and 
addresses group personality. The law is accepted since it is embodied in extensively 
accepted usages and practices in forms of covenants and customs119. Implicit in this 
principle is the desire for oneness. Where one is allowed to avenge, this oneness 
falls and a cycle of violence may ensue per the words of Mahatma Gandi that ‘an 
eye for an eye will make the whole world blind’. It is this oneness that breeds peace 
through reconciliation hence the contention that peace first, (alien) justice later. 
 
                                                            
117 Gray, C. B. The Philosophy of the Law- An Encyclopaedia, 221. 
118 Kamunde, N. ‘A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF LAW, MORALITY, AND GENOCIDE: LAW IN 
A POST GENOCIDE SOCIETY’, 14. 
119 Kamunde, N A ‘JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF LAW, MORALITY, AND GENOCIDE: LAW IN 
A POST GENOCIDE SOCIETY’, 14. 
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Therefore, where the ICC has applied itself120 to a situation like this, UNSC may 
enter a deferral and hence allow the conception of justice as a wider concept and 
involving other non-legal practices. It allows the time for the application of local 
remedies to situations. A handy instance would be a halt of the Joseph Kony 
prosecution to allow the application of the local mato oput121 practice. This is the 
African sense of justice where the offender atones, agrees to pay compensation, and 
finally, as a sign of reconciliation, shares a bitter root with the victim122. This would 
be an application of social and conciliatory justice more akin to an African setting and 
facilitated by the deferral procedure of the UNSC. 
 
3.5.0. Conclusion: 
Through the Referral and Deferral regimes, the ICC can be used as an instrument 
for keeping international peace despite the attendant problems. However, 
disadvantages appear to outweigh the advantages. In a situation like this, there is 
need for reform to make sure that the good side of the regimes are not 
overshadowed by the bad. It is for this reason that the next chapter will focus on the 
need for reform to allow the ICC/UNSC relationship metamorphose into a 
commensalism123 or in the least, a mutualism124. 
                                                            
120 Through state party referral or proprio motu action by the Proseutor. 
121 A traditional cleansing ceremony which many Acholi people of Uganda believe can bring true 
healing in a way that a formal justice system cannot. Offenders are embraced into the community 
after going through the ceremony. See Barney Afako ‘Reconciliation and justice: ‘Mato oput’ and the 
Amnesty Act’ available at<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/reconciliation-
justice.php> accessed on  7th may 2009. 
122 An Independent Report by Tim Allen WAR AND JUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S INTERVENTION February 
2005,P67 Accessed at < http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/AllenICCReport.pdf> on 7th 
May 2009 
123A relationship where one party benefits more than the other and the other is not harmed at all. See 
Symbiotic relationship- examples Accessed at 
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<http://www.cals.ncsu.edu/course/ent591k/symbiosis.html> on 11 Oct 2009. In this case the ICC may 
be the benefactor. 
124A relationship where both parties benefit equally and there is no harm to either of them. See 
Symbiotic relationships- examples Accessed at 
<http://www.cals.ncsu.edu/course/ent591k/symbiosis.html> on 11 Oct 2009. 
  
 
 
 
 
[38] 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0. Towards the Creation of an Ideal Court 
4.1.0. Introduction: 
As seen in the last chapter, the relationship between the ICC and the UNSC attracts 
both criticism and appraisal. However, the criticism seems to outweigh the appraisal. 
This chapter intends to suggest the way for reform of the relationship. It will firstly 
suggest a modification of the referral regime through the entrenchment of a reserve 
jurisdiction rule. This will be followed by proposals to tame the deferral regime by 
unpacking article 16 of the Rome statute. Finally, an introduction of  
‘application/motion’ system will be suggested.   
 
4.2.0. Modifying the Referral Regime:  
4.2.1. The Reserve Jurisdiction Rule. 
The ICC is a specialised body charged with affording justice on the international 
plane. The member states created it as a resolve ‘to guarantee lasting respect for 
and enforcement of international justice’125. Despite national systems having primacy 
over the prosecution of international crimes under the rule of complementarity126, the 
ICC can be looked upon as a watchdog. Where states are unwilling or unable127 to 
carry out a prosecution, the ICC takes up the case. It can therefore be reasonably 
argued that the ICC is an oversight body for international justice. However, the ICC 
can only be an oversight body to the states parties to the Rome Statute and other 
                                                            
125 Rome Statute, Preamble, para. 11. 
126 Rome Statute, Preamble, para. 10. 
127 Rome Statute, art. 17(a). 
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states who submit to the court’s jurisdiction128. It has limited territorial129 and national 
jurisdiction130. It only touches crimes committed on the territory of and/ or involving 
nationals of member states to the Rome statute and those states who submit to it. 
This bias towards territoriality and personality principles ‘creates sensitive gaps in 
the court’s jurisdiction’131. 
UNSC resolutions have binding authority over all member states to the UN 
Charter132. One such resolution may be to submit a state to the jurisdiction of the 
ICC in the quest to keep and maintain international peace. With the aid of such 
UNSC resolution under chapter VII of the Charter, the ICC’s limited jurisdiction can 
be extended to non-member states to the Rome statute.  
In summary, the ICC has three levels of jurisdiction. The first one is treaty-based 
jurisdiction and catches all member states to the Rome statute. The second is state-
submitted jurisdiction where non-member states to the Rome statute voluntarily 
submit to the jurisdiction of the court. The third and relevant to the discussion is 
UNSC enforced jurisdiction. This is the reserve jurisdiction. To make sense of the 
ICC’s status as the watchdog for international criminal justice and to end the 
duplication of roles and collision of means as discussed earlier, the possession of 
this reserve jurisdiction and the UNSC’s involvement in the same needs to be 
improved. The following suggestions are considered.  
 
                                                            
128 Rome Statute, art. 12. 
129 Rome Statute, art. 12, para. 2 (a). 
130 Rome Statute, art. 12, para. 2 (b). 
131 Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 21, marginal note 64. 
132 UN Charter, art. 25. 
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4.2.1.1. Entrenching Priority in Article 13: 
Article 13 of the Rome Statute firstly provides for state referral. UNSC referrals come 
second. Lastly, the proprio motu action by the prosecutor is provided. It is proposed 
that the article should be in order of priority. Under the rule of complementarity, 
states have primacy over prosecution of international crimes. Where they cannot 
carry out the prosecution, they have the option of making a state referral. Therefore 
paragraph (a) is in order.  
The second limb in order of priority should be the Prosecutor acting proprio motu133. 
This is where the Prosecutor receives information about commission of crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the court and he or she initiates an investigation134. The rational for 
this paragraph is that at times Governments may keep mum about gross violations of 
human rights thereby facilitating impunity. The Prosecutor is allowed to break this 
wall of silence and initiate a justice course. Therefore paragraph 13 (c) should 
become paragraph 13 (b). 
The final limb in order of priority should be the UNSC referral. It should be noted that 
the above two limbs involve member states or submissive states. In other words, 
they deal with the court’s limited territorial and national jurisdiction. Paragraph 13 (c) 
should therefore extend this jurisdictional reach and deal with the situation where the 
relevant states are not states parties to the Rome Statute. This should be the 
paragraph conferring the ICC with the reserve jurisdiction. 
 
                                                            
133 Rome Statute, art. 13 (c). See also art. 15. 
134 Rome Statute, art. 15. 
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4.2.2.  Significance of the Reserve Jurisdiction Rule 
Entrenching priority in article 13 will facilitate the application of the Reserve 
Jurisdiction rule. If this approach is adopted, several deficiencies in the UNSC/ICC 
relationship will be remedied as follows; 
 
4.2.2.1. The Clearing the Appearance of Politicisation: 
The reserve jurisdiction rule allows the UNSC to make a referral to the ICC only in 
cases where the court is devoid of jurisdiction. This will rid the UNSC action of any 
appearance of politicisation. The action will have a clear motive of merely awarding 
the ICC with jurisdiction to cases beyond those envisaged in article 12 of the Rome 
Statute. However, this must not murk the soaring threat of selectivity in the 
international community’s approach to international crimes135. The UNSC may still 
only award the ICC the jurisdiction as a political tool against those unfavorable to the 
UNSC members. Despite this ever attendant danger, the Reserve jurisdiction rule 
will afford the ICC meaningful level of legitimacy and independence. 
 
4.2.2.2. Ending the Duplication of Roles:  
The ICC prosecutor has the task to watch for and investigate and further prosecute 
crimes under the Rome Statute. Crimes under the Rome Statute most often involve 
situations where international peace is breached and states parties to the Rome 
Statute recognise that ‘grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of 
                                                            
135 Phillipe, X, ‘The Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How do these Principles 
Intermesh?’ 398.  <http://journals.cambridge.org> 
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the world’136. In the same breath, the UNSC is mandated to take measures to secure 
international peace and security. The UNSC can also employ judicial measures to 
achieve this objective. This creates two bodies responsible for one role: keeping 
international peace through the justice method. The role is divided into two through 
application of the reserve jurisdiction rule. The ICC prosecutor looks at the cases 
under the Rome Statute jurisdiction and the UNSC looks at those beyond the 
prosecutor’s reach for lack of jurisdiction. 
The above contention has several advantages. It truly manifests the UNSC role as 
international peace keeper as it comes to the aid of the ICC where the court has no 
competence. Secondly the move is justified by the award of jurisdiction to the court. 
It smacks of foul play where the UNSC moves in a situation where the ICC would 
move on its own. Thirdly, it affords the court a quasi-global jurisdiction. The UNSC 
award of jurisdiction will bind all UN member states137 and thereby extend the reach 
of the ICC tentacles to those who are either mere signatories or third states138.  
4.2.3. A Call for Amendment to Article 13: 
As discussed above, article 13 should be drafted in order of priority. Further to this, 
the paragraph (c) dealing with the UNSC referral should have an extra clause 
entrenching the reserve jurisdiction rule. It is therefore suggested that article 13 of 
the Rome Statute be amended as follows; 
                                                            
136 Rome Statute, preamble para. 3. 
137 UN Charter, art. 25: The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present charter. 
138 As of 15 October, 2009, the UN Charter has 192 member states. See 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/org1469.doc.htm> while   the Rome Statute has 110 
parties (139 signatories). See 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10&chapter=18&lang=en> 
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The court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this statute if: 
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have 
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State party in 
accordance with article 14; 
(b) The Prosecutor has initiated and investigation in respect of such 
a crime in accordance with article 15; 
(c) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have 
been committed is referred to the prosecutor by the Security Council 
acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Such 
referral shall only be made where the Court has no jurisdiction 
under article 12 of the Statute. [the extra clause in bold] 
This amendment will guarantee that whenever the UNSC moves under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the UN, its intentions are not politically motivated and are only 
serving the interests of justice by awarding the ICC with extended jurisdiction. 
 
4.3.0. Taming the Deferral Regime: 
Background to the creation of the deferral regime reveals that political considerations 
were given more weight than legal considerations139. Relevant to this discussion is 
that the regime provides an ‘unprecedented opportunity for the Council to influence 
                                                            
139 See Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1999) 
(2nd Ed), article 16, marginal notes 1 and 2. 
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the work of a judicial body’140. The UNSC, an external body, stops the court 
processes unilaterally. Following are a few suggestions on how the regime may be 
tamed so as to inspire international legitimacy. 
4.3.1. Unpacking Article 16: 
Article 16 of the Rome statute refers to the commencement and progress of 
investigations and prosecutions. It provides as follows: 
‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has 
requested the court to that effect; That request may be renewed by the 
Council under the same conditions’ 
The article allows the halt of investigations and prosecutions. This is regardless of 
the fact that investigations and prosecutions are not one and the same exercise. It is 
also oblivious to the involvement of the Court as a stakeholder in the prosecution 
stage. It is suggested, therefore, that the article be unpacked into three separate 
sub-paragraphs. One should deal with the deferral of the commencement or 
progress of investigations. The second should deal with the deferral of the 
commencement of prosecutions. A third paragraph should deal with the deferral of 
the progress of prosecutions.  
The rationale for the unpacking of the article is as follows. The office of the 
Prosecutor has a dual functionality. It exercises investigative functions on the one 
hand and prosecutorial functions on the other. The investigative function is a non-
                                                            
140 Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1999) (2nd 
Ed), article 16, marginal note 7. 
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judicial function whereas the prosecutorial is a judicial function. Secondly, the 
investigative function is a pre-prosecutorial function. Investigations are the realm of 
the prosecutor141 and do not involve the court proper142. Prosecutions, however, 
which are also the realm of the office of the prosecutor, involve the court proper. It is 
for these reasons that the halting of the two functions be differentiated in the article. 
The presupposition for this contention is that the judicial machinery of the court starts 
moving only after the prosecutor has approached the court proper, either for an 
application for warrant of arrest or the lodging of charges.  
From the above, therefore, it is suggested that the first paragraph maintains the 
UNSC’s competence to defer the commencement or progress of investigations as 
follows; 
1. ‘No investigation may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute 
for a period of 12 months after the security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the 
court to that effect; That request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions’ 
The second suggested paragraph should maintain the UNSC’s power to defer the 
commencement of a prosecution. It may appear in the following fashion; 
2. ‘No prosecution may be commenced under this Statute for a period of 12 
months after the security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the court to that 
                                                            
141 Rome Statute, art 42, para 1. 
142 The Judicial chambers namely the Appeals Division, The Trial Division and the Pre-Trial Division. 
See Rome Statute, Art 34.  
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effect; That request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions’ 
4.3.2. Application/ Motion for Deferral: 
Judicial processes can only be stopped internally and by another legitimate judicial 
process. External interferences threaten judicial independence. For instance, once a 
prosecutor has initiated a trial, the process only stops by withdrawal of charges by 
the prosecution or the acquittal and conviction of the suspects by the court. 
Temporary ‘stops’ are provided by adjournments/continuances. These ‘stop’ 
mechanisms illustrate the respect for the independence and legitimacy of a judicial 
body. They ensure that only legally relevant reasons account for the stopping of the 
court machinery. Of relevance to the present discussion is the 
adjournment/continuance143 mechanism which may be likened to the deferral. An 
adjournment is a matter for the court to decide in the light of an adequate account of 
the background against which the application is made. The court expects to be 
provided with an explanation of the reasons grounding an application for the 
adjournment or postponement of any trial144. Judicial bodies, by virtue of their 
authority to attend to and decide cases, have innate discretionary power to allow or 
reject adjournments. A court will grant an adjournment when the application 
discloses enough grounds that a miscarriage of justice will be done by the continued 
                                                            
143 The postponement of an action pending in a court to a later date of the same or another session of 
the court, granted by a court in response to a motion or application made by a party to a lawsuit. See 
West’s Encyclopedia of American Law. Available on 21 October 2009 at  
<http://www.answers.com/topic/continuance> 
144 Cf. Practice note No.1 of 2004 Adjournment and postponement of trials in the high court of 
Justiciary issued by Scotish Court. Accessed on 21 October 2009 at 
<http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/justiciary/practicenotes/pn01_2004.pdf> 
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hearing of the case145. It will examine all the facts and circumstances of a case — in 
particular, the applicant's good faith, the rationale and necessity for the adjournment, 
the likely gain that could result from the adjournment and the possibility of prejudice 
to the rights of other stakeholders146. In short, the interests of justice form a valid 
consideration in these applications.  
It is suggested that the above practice be applied to the deferral regime. At the 
Rome Conference, Denmark insisted that on top of just having an International 
criminal court, states should ensure that the ICC acts in the same way in which 
national justice systems are expected to act147. The application/motion system is 
aimed at respecting the independence and impartiality of the judicial body. It is also 
mindful of the existence of multiple stakeholders in the justice system, a 
consideration more relevant at the international level. The rights of the victims of 
international crimes are brought to the fore in international criminal law148.  
To emulate the national example, the third paragraph of article 16 should introduce 
the concept of ‘application’ or ‘motion for Deferral’. This will allow the court to 
conduct deferral proceedings as an instance of a stop mechanism. The paragraph 
would be drafted as follows; 
3. ‘The UNSC shall have the power, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to request the Court to defer a 
continuing prosecution for a period of 12 months. That request shall be 
                                                            
145 See West’s Encyclopedia of American Law. Available on 21 October 2009 at  
<http://www.answers.com/topic/continuance> 
146 West’s Encyclopedia of American Law. Available on 21 October 2009 at  
<http://www.answers.com/topic/continuance.> 
147 www.un.org./icc/pressrel/1rom15.htm. 
148 Victim involvement and the protection of their rights forms a huge part of the court’s considerations 
in its work. The Rome Statute is replete with references to victims as seen in, inter alia, arts. 15(3), 19 
(3), 43 (6), 53 (1)(c), 53 (2)(c), 54 (1)(b), 68. 
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made by way of application filed with [or motion made before] the court by 
the Prosecutor and may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions’. 
This article would allow the UNSC to apply to court for deferral. It will also allow the 
court the discretion to accept or deny the same. The court will have the discretion 
and independence that any judicial body needs for its own legitimacy. 
 
4.4.0. Conclusion: 
The current relation between the ICC and the UNSC is useful but it is not 
satisfactory. It is the former in that it affords the court jurisdiction in cases outside the 
scope of the article 12. It is the latter in that it perpetrates impunity. It also violates 
the principles of complementarity149 and pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt150. In 
the context of the above, judicial independence and legitimacy are compromised. It 
has therefore been suggested that the UNSC referral should be reserved for cases 
where the ICC has no jurisdiction. As for the deferral, the UNSC should keep its 
competence to  stop the commencement and progress of investigations. It should 
also keep the competence to halt the commencement of prosecutions. However, 
once prosecution has started the UNSC should only be able to stop the same upon 
application laid before the court and the grant of the same by the court. This will 
                                                            
149 Complementarity principles guarantees that national jurisdictions have primacy over trial of 
international crimes yet the UNSC referral will force the national jurisdiction to submit to the ICC 
jurisdiction as primary forum. 
150 A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent. See Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties, art. 34. The UNSC referral will force non-member states to bow 
to the obligations under the Rome Statute, a treaty they may not be party to. However, it has been 
contended that these obligations stem from the UNSC resolution and not the Rome Statute. See 
Yitiha Simbeye Immunity and International Criminal Law, 19.  
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ensure judicial independence as the court itself will be making the decision to stop 
the prosecution. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0. Conclusion and Recommendations: 
 
5.1.0. Overview: 
Under chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC can pass a resolution referring a 
situation to the ICC for possible investigation and prosecution. Under the same 
powers the UNSC can also request the court to defer proceedings. The rational is 
that keeping and maintaining international peace is a multifaceted function. It may be 
promoted by prosecutions and investigations. The function may also be frustrated by 
investigations and prosecutions. Therefore, the UNSC as a body charged with that 
function must have both powers of referral and deferral. However, a close 
examination of the dual function reveals that the court may be reduced to a political 
puppet of the UNSC.  
The paper has, hence, critically looked at the relationship between the ICC and the 
UNSC in the light of the latter to use the former as an instrument for achieving its 
mandate under chapter VII of the UN Charter. This has been done through close 
scrutiny of the referral and deferral regimes created under the Rome Statute as they 
are the mechanisms which allow the UNSC to use the ICC in its quest to keep and 
maintain international peace. Central to the study has been the contention that the 
relation between the two bodies is useful but unsatisfactory. Besides critically 
analysing the relationship, the paper has also suggested possible ways of improving 
the relationship so that the court can retain its judicial independence, impartiality and 
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legitimacy. Below are the conclusions drawn from the study to be followed by the 
summary of the recommendations. 
 
5.2.0. Conclusions: 
5.2.1. The Referral Regime: 
The Rome Statute allows the UNSC to bring situations to the attention of the ICC 
Prosecutor for possible investigation and prosecution. The referral regime is couched 
in terms that disguise the grip of the UNSC on a court that requires independence 
and legitimacy. As one arm of the relationship, the referral regime casts amounts of 
doubt on the status of the court as an independent international criminal court 
capable of making its own decisions and choices.  
The UNSC mandated by chapter VII of the UN Charter wields immense powers to 
the extent that its referral of a situation to the ICC is a criminal charge in disguise. 
The court does not have much to do but find a few suspects to try as failure of the 
same will reverberate back to the UNSC and show its decision for referral as tainted 
with bad faith. It simple terms, the referral is a command in disguise. It therefore robs 
the court of the vital element of independence and discretion. Lack of these elements 
renders the court redundant in a world where everyone is watchful of the works of 
the court, not to mention the suspicion surrounding the same. 
The referral regime however has an advantage because it affords the court criminal 
jurisdiction outside the scope of article 12 of the Rome Statute. This is vital to the 
work of the court as discussed above. 
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5.2.3. The Deferral Regime: 
The second arm of the UNSC/ICC relationship is the deferral regime. Under this arm, 
the UNSC has powers to halt proceedings at the Court. Investigations and 
prosecutions can be stopped before and after they are commenced. This is therefore 
the arm that wields immense power and in the end the most devastating to the 
independence and legitimacy of the court as a judicial body. 
There are several problems with this regime. Firstly, all the UNSC does is pass a 
resolution and the court on its own motion stops the proceedings. It has neither 
choice nor say on the reason forwarded by the UNSC. This is an erosion of the 
court’s independence and discretion. Secondly the request is a command in 
disguise. The UNSC just decides and the court obeys. This is an erosion of the 
court’s legitimacy as a truly judicial body and portrays the court as a political tool in 
the hands of the representatively imbalanced UNSC. Thirdly, the regime may 
perpetrate impunity in an era where there is no such option for the crimes falling 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC. The UNSC may halt prosecutions which are now 
believed to be the international threshold for dealing with serious atrocities as 
envisaged in the Rome Statute. This is counterproductive in the light of the strides 
made in the quest to rid the world of atrocities that offend all humanity. 
Despite the above minuses, the deferral regime may achieve some good ends. It 
may promote the application of local remedies to the atrocities. These may be 
essential for lasting peace. A good example may be the call for deferral for the 
Joseph Kony prosecution and the introduction of the mato oput151 practice of the 
                                                            
151 Mato Oput literally means "drinking the bitter root of an oput tree". Oketta says it symbolizes the 
end to a bitter relationship between two clan communities or families of offenders and the offended. 
See Acholi want more prominent role for Mato Oput. Accessed on 19 October 2009 at 
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local Ugandan people. Some have argued that this is the only way to peace that 
lasts in Uganda152. 
5.3.0. Recommendations: 
In the light of the above discussed conclusions, it is arguable that the relationship 
between the ICC and the UNSC allows a threatening level of interference into the 
court’s work, all under the guise of keeping and maintaining international peace. 
Judicial independence is compromised and international legitimacy of the court is in 
dire straits. The relationship further leaves the court vulnerable to politicisation by the 
UNSC. These are the compelling reasons for the relationship to be tamed or 
improved. The following paragraphs, therefore, summarise several ways of taming 
and improving the UNSC/ICC relationship so that it becomes more useful and 
satisfactory. 
5.3.1. The Referral Regime: 
The UNSC is probably the most powerful political body in the world. It wields 
immense influence in the realm of international politics to an extent that it may be 
said to be the core of the United Nations. It therefore follows that the court benefits a 
lot by relating with such a body. When the UNSC makes a referral, however, it 
should not make it in situations where the prosecutor or state parties acting on their 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/daily/Heritage.asp?about=Acholi+want+more+prominent+role+for+
Mato+Oput&ID=1025> 
152‘ Barney Afako (2002) states that:  
“The unacceptably high costs of civil war have caused Ugandans to re-assess approaches to 
resolving conflict. Among the Acholi of northern Uganda, the bitter experience of unending conflict has 
generated a remarkable commitment to reconciliation and a peaceful settlement of the conflict rather 
than calling for retribution against the perpetrators of serious abuses… This call for amnesty was 
underpinned by their faith in the capacity of the community and cultural institutions to manage 
effective reconciliation even against the background of serious offences”’. See Joseph Yav Katshung  
‘Mato Oput versus the International Criminal Court (ICC) In Uganda’. Available at Pan African Voices 
for Freedom and Justice –Pambazuka News, 
<http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/37403> 
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own would move. The Referral power of the UNSC should therefore be a reserve 
jurisdiction mechanism and used for the purposes of awarding the court with 
jurisdiction only. The referral therefore should be a grant of jurisdiction and not a 
placement of a situation in the court machinery as the current set up allows. 
To facilitate the above suggestion, article 13 of the Rome Statute needs to be 
amended so that it can arrange the trigger mechanisms in order of priority. This 
should not be priority of importance but priority of use. This will be in line with the 
principle of complementarity. It is the state party to the statute that has primacy over 
trying the Rome Statute crimes. The state is seconded by the ICC Prosecutor who 
acts where the state is either unwilling or unable. The Prosecutor also acts on his 
own initiative. The third should be the UNSC referral. It should only be unleashed 
where the State has not or cannot act and the prosecutor cannot act due to lack of 
jurisdiction. This is advantageous to the ICC’s International image as the reasons for 
the UNSC referring the situation will be only to award the court with jurisdiction and 
nothing else. 
5.3.2. The Deferral Regime: 
The ICC, as the judicial institution that it is, demands independence. This may be 
manifest in the non-interference of its processes by any other external body, the 
UNSC inclusive. The deferral regime which allows the UNSC to halt investigations 
and prosecutions runs counter to this ideal. The UNSC should therefore only be 
allowed to stop investigations and for a definite period. This is contrary to the current 
situation where the UNSC can defer the investigations and prosecutions for indefinite 
periods of 12 months a piece. The above should also apply to prosecutions before 
they are commenced. Once prosecutions are commenced the UNSC should be 
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incapable of halting the same by a mere passing of a resolution. If national court 
practice is anything to go by, the executive branch of the government, which may be 
likened to the UNSC, cannot just decide in cabinet to halt on-going prosecutions. 
The normal practice is to apply to the court for an adjournment or continuance. This 
practice is entrenched in the deep respect for the judicial nature of the courts. It also 
manifests the independence of the judiciary as it is able to decide on the 
adjournment or continuance. The same practice should be applied at the ICC. The 
UNSC should request the ICC Prosecutor to file an application/motion for deferral. 
The court should be allowed to decide whether to grant it or not. In this way judicial 
independence will be encouraged. Therefore this paper calls for the amendment of 
article 16 of the Rome Statute so that it reflects the above suggestions. 
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6.0. EPILOGUE 
The UNSC/ICC relationship is an opportunity for both success and failure of the ICC. 
As a new body on the international plane, the ICC needs to amass legitimacy and 
independence if it is to gain respect and cooperation. It ought to be an independent 
international body achieving its objectives as outlined under the Rome Statute. It is 
not for the ICC to help the UNSC foster its political objectives. Rather it is the UNSC 
that should foster the objectives of the ICC by awarding it jurisdiction and letting it be 
independent. The ICC’s involvement with the UNSC should, therefore, not be 
allowed to derail the good intentions of the framers of the Rome Statute. 
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